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Institutions and Economic Growth
Last Updated: 2026-02-05 15:29:38
Abstract
How institutions affect economic growth and vice versa.
Objective
In this seminar we will discuss major contributions to the literature on institutions and economic growth. The goal of the seminar is twofold. On the one hand, we will learn how different institutions affect long run economic well being. On the other hand, we will obtain an overview over one of the most vibrant fields of economic research.
Content
Date Article Presenter Feb. 20th Organisational Meeting Feb. 27th Acemoglu et al. (2005a), North (1991) Maik T. Schneider March 5th Aghion (2006) March 12th Knack and Keefer (1995) March 19th Murphy et al. (1993), Grossman (2001) April 2nd Grossman and Lai (2004) April 9th Aghion et al. (2005) April 16th Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) April 23rd Persson (2002) April 30th Krusell et al. (1997) May 7th Aghion et al. (2004) May 14th Besley and Persson (2007) May 21st Acemoglu (2006) May 28th Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
Resources
Literature
Daron Acemoglu. Modelling Inefficient Institutions. Advances in Economic Theory World Congress, 2006. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions. The American Economic Review (forthcoming), 2008. Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti. Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth. The Journal of Political Economy, 105(4):709–751, 1997. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. Institutions as the Fundamen- tal Cause of Long-Run Growth. In Philippe Aghion and Steve N. Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth, chapter 6, pages 385 – 470. Elsevier, 2005a. Philippe Aghion. On Institutions and Growth. In Theo S. Eicher and Cecilia Garcia- Penalosa, editors, Institutions, Development, and Economic Growth, pages 3–32. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. Endogenous Political Insti- tutions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):565–611, 2004. Philippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt. Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):701–728, 2005. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. Working Paper, 2007. Gene M. Grossman and Edwin L.C. Lai. International Protection of Intellectual Prop- erty. The American Economic Review, 94(5):1635–1653, 2004. Herschel I. Grossman. The Creation of Effective Property Rights. The American Economic Review, 91(2):347–352, 2001. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross- Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, 7 (3):207 – 227, 1995. Per Krusell, Vincenzo Quadrini, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull. Politico-Economic Equi- librium and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21(1): 243–272, 1997. Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Why Is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth? American Economic Review, 83(2):409–414, 1993. Papers and Proceed- ings. Douglas C. North. Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1):97–112, 1991. Torsten Persson. Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy? Econometrica, 70 (3):883 – 905, 2002.
General Information
- Language
- English
- Levels
- MSC
Examination
- Type
- graded semester performance
Course Components
| Type | Title | Time & Place | Hours |
|---|---|---|---|
| seminar | Institutions and Economic Growth |
|
2 h weekly |
Offered In
-
Management, Technology and Economics Master (Welcome and Introduction to new MSc MTEC ETH Monday, 18th February 2008, 16.15h, room: ML F 36)