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Design of Institutions and Political Economy
Last Updated: 2026-02-05 15:55:26
Abstract
Institutions and in particular political institutions are a central determinant of economic performance. In this course, we learn the characteristics of collective decision making and political processes as well as the theoretical tools in institutional design. At the end of the course we will discuss recent research in political economics, design of institutions and policy.
Objective
In this doctoral course, we learn the theoretical tools and major results in collective decision theory and political economics. We will use this knowledge to discuss recent research in political economics. The course enables the participants to do their own research in political economics or apply the frameworks to interesting institutional design problems in their own research area.
Content
Part I: Theoretical Tools and Important Results (lectures) 1. Collective Decision Making and Impossibility Results 2. Voting Models 3. Lobbying 4. Creating Institutions: A Mechanism Design Perspective 5. Dynamic Political Economy Part II: Recent Research in Political Economics (presentations)
General Information
- Language
- English
- Levels
- DR
- Frequency
- Every two years
Examination
- Type
- graded semester performance
Course Components
| Type | Title | Time & Place | Hours |
|---|---|---|---|
| lecture |
Design of Institutions and Political Economy
Permission from lecturers required for all students.
|
|
2 h weekly |
Offered In
-
Doctoral Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (More Information at: )